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§ 11. Application of Purchase-money.-" It has long been
settled that either upon a trust or a charge a purchaser is not
bound to see that the money is applied either to the payment of
debts generally, or to the satisfaction of legacies out of the surplus
after the debts are paid. The reason is, that it would defeat a sale
if the law obliged a purchaser to attend to the execution of a trust
so indefinite as the payment of all debts, which he would have no
means of ascertaining. Legacies out of the fund stand on the same
footing, because the purchaser would necessarily have to go through
the administration of the assets and see at his risk that the debts
are paid before he could let the legatees have anything :" Hfauser
v. Shore, 5 Ired. Eq. 357, 862 ; 2 Williams on Ex'rs 935; Elliot
v. IMerrtman, 1 Lead. Cas. in Eq. 59, 67, and note, p. 112. "Like
reason doth make like law :" Broom's Maxims 154. Accordingly
the same rule would seem to extend to administrators c. t. a.; Evans
v. CheV, 8 Phila. 103; s. a. 71 Penn. St. 47, 51.
JAMES H. BROWN.
Denver, Col.
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ST. CLAIR STREET RAILWAY CO. v. EADIE.
A minor child, who being sui juris as to a reasonable care of her person and
safety lawfully and properly enters into a conveyance driven by her parent, and
without fault on her part is injured by the negligence of the driver of another vehicle, is not prevented from recovering damages against the proprietor of the latter

vehicle, because her parent has by his negligence contributed to the injury.
Transfer Co. v. KePl 3 ,, 36 Ohio St. 86, followed. Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B.
115, disapproved.

to the District Court of Cuyahoga County.
This was an action for damages for an injury alleged to have been
caused by defendants' negligence. The plaintiff was a minor, aged
sixteen years, and was fully capable of taking reasonable care of
herself. She was lawfully riding with her father, who was driving
his own wagon, when she was injured by a collision between the
wagon and a street-car, caused by the mutual and concurring negligence of a street-car driver and her father, but without any fault
or negligence on her part. The court below held that the negligence
ERROR
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of her father was not to be imputed or attributed to her, and did
not bar a recovery against the street-car company, whose negligence
directly contributed to the injury. The street-car company took this
writ of error.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
JOHNSON, J.-Tbe plaintiff, though a minor, was sixteen years
old, and was, therefore, suijuris. She was fully capable of taking
care of herself. Had her negligence or misconduct contributed to
her injury, she could not recover, though the company was also
guilty. The question fairly presented, therefore, is, whether a minor
child, who being suijuris as to a reasonable care of her person and
safety, lawfully and properly enters into a conveyance with her
parent, and without fault on her part is injured by the negligence
of a street railroad company, is prevented from recovering against
such negligent company because her parent has,.by his negligence,
contributed to the injury. In Transfer Co. v. Kelly, 36 Ohio St.
86, this court held that the concurrent negligence of a street-car
company, whose passenger the plaintiff was, with that of a transfer company, whereby there was a collision between the wagon of
the latter with the car of the former, cannot be imputed to the passenger, so as to charge him with contributory negligence. In that
case, as in this, the plaintiff was not in fault; but there, as here,
it was contended that the plaintiff was so identified with, or related
to, the railroad company by the contract of carriage that the fault
of the carrier must be imputed to the passenger. Neither in that
case nor in this was there any fadlt alleged against plaintiff for
becoming a passenger. The two cases differ in two respects only.
There the carriage was by a public carrier, presumably for hire or
reward, while here it was by private conveyance, and presumably
gratuitous. There the driver of the street-car was a stranger to the
passenger, while here he was her father, with whom she was riding
home. In that case it was held that the driver in the street-car was
in no just sense the agent or servant of the passenger. If the driver
had been under the control of the passenger, then it was said there
might be some show of reason for holding the passenger liable for
the negligence of the driver. But as there was no such power of
direction or control, the negligence of the driver of the car could
not be imputed to the passenger. That was held to be a case of
joint negligence of the railroad company and the transfer company,
for which they might be sued jointly or severally.
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After a thorough examination of the numerous and conflicting
authorities upon this point, some of which are cited in the opinion,
we then declined to follow the case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C.
B: 115, and other like cases, which holds the passenger liable for
the contributory negligence of his driver, where there was mutual
fault of two drivers causing an injury, and, as before stated, held
that upon principle, as well as upon the better authorities, the passenger was not so identified with the vehicle in which he was riding
as to make him responsible for the driver's fault. It was held by
us that the passenger in that street-car was not responsible for the
negligence of the driver; that the latter was in no just sense
the agent of the former, and had no control of, or direction
over, the management of the vehicle in which he was riding, so as
to identify driver and passenger.
The opposite doctrine, though supported by high authority, has
not been received even in England with approbation.
We cite a few of the cases and text-books touching this vexed
question, but, since the subject was fully considered in Transfer Co.
v. Kelly, supra, we need not further cqnsider it. See Armstrong v.
Lancashire By. Co., L. R., 10 Exch. 47; Waite v. N. E. Rd.,
El., Bl. & El. 719 (a case of a child too young to take care of
itself) ; Lockhart v. Lichtenthaler, 46 Penn. St. 151 ; Thompson
on Carriers of Passengers, c. 7, where all the cases pro and con are
cited, notes, p. 284; Bennett v. N. JT. Rd., 36 N. J. L. 221; 1
Smith's Lead. Cases (8th Am. ed.) p. 505, *315; -Danville Turnpike Co. v. Stewart, 2 Met. (Ky.) 119; Chapman v. N. H. Rd.
Co., 19 N. Y. 341; Colegrove v. N. Y. J- N. H. Rd. Co., 20 Id.
492; Louisville, etc., Rd. v. Case's Adm'r, 9 Bush (Ky.), 728;
Wharton on Neg. § 395; Webster v. -H. R. Rd. Co., 38 N. Y. 260.
The foregoing cases mostly relate to passengers by public carriers,
and when the passenger is injured by the negligence of another
public carrier, or of a third person.
It only remains to determine if a like rule applies when the plaintiff was passenger in a private conveyance. We think it does.
The plaintiff in the case at bar was in no just sense the master, nor
was her father her agent or under her control or direction. In
Puterbaugh v. Reasor, 9 Ohio St. 484. the want of ordinary care
of plaintiff's agent prevented his recovery, when the agent's negligence directly contributed to the injury, though the defendant was
also guilty. But it is well settled that passengers in a public convey-
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ance are not *so liable for the negligence of the employees of the
carrier, because they are not the agents of the passenger. The,
same reasons apply with equal force to a private carrier. Plaintiff's
relations to her father being that of a passenger in his wagon,
going to their common home, did not, in law, make him her servant or agent, and as such responsible for his misconduct. If he
had brought an action for the loss of services of his daughter,
caused by this injury, his contributory negligence would defeat a
recovery, nor could he recover for his own injuries for the same
reason. This is because he was guilty with the defendant of causing the collision. Neither does the fact that she was the daughter
defeat her rights. If her father's misconduct or negligence contributed to the injury, why should that fact exonerate a joint wrongdoer ? Robinson v. N. Y. Gent. Rd., 66 N. Y. 11, was the case
of a female who had accepted an invitation to ride with a gentleman, who was the owner and driver of a buggy in which they were
riding, when she was injured through the joint negligence of her
driver and a train of cars. CiuRcH, 0. J., says: cc I am unable
to find any legal principle upon which to impute to plaintiff the
negligence of the driver. * * * The acceptance of an invitation to
ride creates no more responsibility for the acts of the driver, than
the riding in a stage coach, or even a train of cars, providing there
was no negligence on account of the character or condition of the
driver or the safety of the vehicle, or otherwise. It is no excuse
for the negligence of defendant that another person's negligence
contributed to the injury for whose acts the plaintiff was not
responsible."
We think this reasoning unanswerable, notwithstanding the
adverse criticism and contrary holding in Prideauxv. City of Mineral Point, 43 Wis. 513. This doctrine of " imputed negligence"
and the reasons for its application were considered in B. & I. Rd.
Co. v. Snyder, 18 Ohio St. 399. That was the case of a child six
years old, and the negligence of the parent or custodian of'the
child did not prevent its recovery against one also guilty. The
court say the rule that contributory negligence bars a recovery is
founded on, 1. The mutuality of the wrong; 2. The impolicy of
allowing a party to recover for his own wrong; and 3. The policy
of making personal interests of parties depend on their own prudence and care. It was said all these were wanting in the case then
before the court. With equal truth it can be said that all these rea-
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sons are wanting in the present case, where it is conceded the plaintiff was in no fault. Whether in this case the father would have been
jointly liable with defendant, we need not now determine. By the
well-settled rule of law he would be, unless his relation to her modifies this rule, for his culpable negligence, she being sui juris and
not guilty of want of proper care for her own safety: Boyd v.
Watt, 27 Ohio St. 259; Whart. on Neg. § 144; Shear. & Redf.
on Neg. § 58.
If it be conceded that he would not be so liable, either by reason
of his parental relation or that it was a gratuitous service, that
would not excuse the negligence of the defendant, nor bar the
plaintiff, who was free from fault, from recovering from the other
wrongdoer, whose negligence was a proximate cause of injury.
Judgment affirmed.
As is well known to the profession, the
English case of Thorogood v. Bryan, 8
C. B. 114, 122, holds a different doctrine from that of the principal case. In
that case it is held that a passenger upon
an omnibus of a common carrier who
receives injuries caused from the concurring negligence of such carrier and a
third person, is not entitled to recover
damages from the third person, for the
reason that the passenger is so identified
with the carrier and his servants, that
the negligence of the carrier is to be imputed to the passenger, i. e., that such
passenger contributed to his own injury.
This doctrine has been expressly repudiated in a number of well-considered
cases in this country: nor has it been
received with approbation in England :
Waite v. North Eastern By., El., 1. &
El. 728 : Tuffv. Warrnan, 2 C. B. (N.
S.) 750.
In The Milan, 1 Lush. 388, 403, the
judge of the High Court of Admiralty,
in speakingof Thorogoodv. Bryan, said:
"With respect to the judges who decided that case, I do not consider that it is
necessary for me to dissect the judgment,
but I decline to be bound by it, because
it is a single case: because I know, upon
inquiry, that it has been doubted by high
authority: because it appears to me not

reconcilable with other principles laid
down at common law: lastly, because it
is directly against Hay v. Le Neve, 2
Shaw's S. C. App. 405, and the ordinary practice of the Court of Admiralty."
Greenland v. Chaplin, 5 Exch. 242,
and Rigby v. Hewitt, Id. 240, cases decided after Thorogood v. Bryan, do not
follow the doctrine of the latter case.
In a note to Ashby v. White, 1 Smith's
Lead. Cas. (6th Am. ed.) 450, we find
the following: "If two drunken stagecoachmen were to drive their respective
carriages against each other, and injure
the passengers, each would have to bear
the injury of his own carriage, no doubt;
but it seems highly unreasonable that
each set of passengers should, by a fiction, be identified with the coachman
who drove them so as to be restricted for
remedy to actions against their own drivers or his employer. This, nevertheless, appears to be the result of the decision in Thorogood v. Bryan, 8 C. B. 115,
but it may be questioned whether the
reasoning in that case is consistent with
with those of .Rigby v. Hewitt, 5 Exch.
240, and Greenlandv. Chaplin, Id. 243,
or with the series of decisions from
Quarman v. Burnett, 6 M. & W. 499, to
Reedie v. London, 6-c., By., 4 Exch. 244,
and Dalyell v. Tyrer, 28 L. J. (Q. B.)
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52. Why in this
particular cam both
wrongdoers should not be considered liable to a person, free from all blame,
not answcrahle for the acts of either of
them, and whom they have both injured,
is a question whiun seems to deserve
more consideration than is received in
Thorogood v. Bryan."
Child v. Hearn, L. R., 9 Exch. 176,
182, and Art'arong v. Lancashire, 6-c.,
Jiy., L. R., 10 Id. 47; s. c. 44 L. J.
(Exch.) 89, seem to approve of the doctrine of " anomalous identification" of
Thorogood v. Bryan.
The doctrine of Thoroqood v. Bryan,
rests on the ground that the plaintiff having voluntarily trusted himself on the
omnibus, had so identified himself with
its management, that the driver's negligence deprived him of any right of action against the owner of the other
vehicle.
The general principle applicable is that
the contributory negligence of a third
person does not constitute a defence, unless such negligence is imputable to the
plaintiff: Burrows v. M1arch Gas t Coke
Co., L. R., 5 Exch. 67; Sheridan v.
Brooklyn, 6-c., lid., 36 N. Y. 39 ; Cayzer v. Taylor, 10 Gray 274; Mott v. H.
R. Rd., 8 ]3osw. 345. Such contributory negligence is not to be imputed to
the plaintiff, unless such third person is
under his direction *or control, as agent
or servant. This doctrine rests on the
familiar maxim, "qui facit per alum,
facit per se," and is just. When this
relation of principal and agent, or master and servant is complete, the contributory negligence of such agent or servant
is always to be imputed to his principal
or master. Paterbaugh v. Reasor, 9
Ohio St. 484, well illustrates this rule.
There the injury resulted from the concurringnegligence of two servants, one
being the servant of the plaintiff. The
plaintiffwas not permitted to recover for
the reason that his servant, over whom
he had control, contributed to the injury,
such negligence being fairly imputed

to him; see Otis v.

TlYm,

23 Ala.

469.
The doctrine of Tlorogood v. Bryan,
supra, seems to have been adopted in
Pennsylvania in Lockhart v. Licltenthaler,
46 Penn. St. 151, 165. There the
injury resulted from the mutual negligence of the servants of both vehicles,
the one in which plaintiff was riding, being a public conveyance, he having no
control over the driver of it, yet the court
held that his driver alone was responsible
for the injury. But while adopting the
doctrine, the court refused to follow the
reason of the English case. THomrsoli,
J., said: (p. 164) "I would say the
reason for it, that it better accords with
the policy of the law to hold the carrier
alone responsible in such circumstances
as an incentive to care and diligence.
As the law fixes the responsibility upon
a different principle in case of the carrier,
as already noticed from that of a party
who does not stand in that relation to
the party injured, the very philosophy of
the requirement of greater care is that he
shall be answerable for omitting any duty
which the law has defined as his rule and
guide, and will not permit him to escape
by imputing negligence of a less culpable
character to others, but sufficient to render them liable for the consequences of
his own. It would be altogether more
just to hold liable him who has engaged
to observe the highest degree of diligence
and care and has been compensated for
so- doing, rather than upon him upon
whom no such obligation rests, and who
not being compensated for the observance of such a degree of care, acts
only on the duty to observe ordinary
care, and may not be aware even of
the presence of a party, who might
be injured.
This rule, it cannot
be doubted, will be more likely to increase diligence than the opposite, which
would enable a negligent and faithless
party to escape the consequences of his
want of care by swearing it on another,
which he would assuredly do if the temp
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tation and opportunity offered.
As collided with another. The servants
this view accords best with the policy of
of both cars were responsible for the acthe law, it is proof of the existence of
cident. It was held that plaintiff could
the rule itself." The court after review- recover from either or both companies,
ing fully the decisions concludes that the and where both are sued, the plaintiff
clear preponderance is in favor of the may ordinarily dismiss as to either, and,
doctrine that mutual negligence in case if it turns out at the trial that one was
of an injury to a third person is a denot guilty of negligence, he may, on
sufficient evidence, take a verdict against
fence.
In Pennsylvania this doctrine was the other; but satisfaction received from
again affirmed in Phila. 4- Reading lid. one company, is a bar to an action against
v. Boyer, 97 Penn. St. 91, 100, where the other. The court said: "Every
death was caused by collision of a street party contributing to the injury of plaincar that deceased was on, and a locomo- tiff was liable to the full extent of damtive of defendant.
The court stated ages by her sustained.
Her injuries
that the success of the action depended gave her but a single cause of action.
upon two assumptions: (1) That death * * * Damages resulting from the same
resulted directly from the carelessness of
wrongful transaction are ordinarily insepthe defendants' servants: (2) That the erable ; she could not recover part from
person in charge of the street-car was one and part from the other defendant:"
chargeable with no negligence. "4It is
Urton v. ice, 7 Pac. C. L. J. 82 ; 57
on this hypothesis that suit can be main- Cal. 272 ; Cooley on Torts 139.
tained, for the rule is, that where a pasChapman v. New Haven Rd., 19 N. Y.
senger on a carrier vehicle is injured by 341, is against Thorogood v. Bryan, also.
a collision resulting from the mutual The plaintiff was a passenger on a "New
negligence of those in charge of it, and York and Harlem train. The injury ocanother party, the carrier alone must an- curred by collision of his train with answer for the injury: Lockhart v. Lich- other train, through concurring negligence of the managers of the respective
tenthaler, supra.
But the better rule is that where the trains. It was held that the passenger
negligence is joint, he may recover from was not so identified with the proprietors,
either, or both. This rule is supported or their servants, of the train conveying
by the weight of authority: Colegrove v. him as to be responsible for negligence
Rd., 20 N. Y. 492 ; s. c. 6 Duer 382 ; on their part, and therefore he could recoWebster v. Hudson, 38 N. Y. 260; Da- ver from defendant. Referring to Thovey v. Chamberlain, 4 Esp. 229 ; Whar- rogood v. Bryan, JoHnsoz;, C. J., said
ton on Neg. 395 ; Barrett v. Rd., 45 (p. 344), "But I do not see the justice
N. Y. 628. Danville, 4-c., Tp. v. Stewart, of the doctrine in connection with the
2 Met. (Ky.) 119, lays down the rule case before us. It is entirely plain that
that where an injury is occasioned by the the plaintiff has no control, management,
negligence of two persons, the fault of even no advisory power over the train
one is no excuse for that of the other. on which he was riding. Even as to seBoth in such case are liable to the party lection he has the choice of going by that
injured; following the principle of this railroad or none. To attribute to him
case is Louisville, 4-c., Rd. v. Case, 9 therefore the negligence of the agents of
Bush (Ky.) 728, 73.5.
the company and thus bar him of a right
In Tomkins v. Clay Street HillRailroad of recovery is not applying any existing
Co., 4 West Coast Rep. 537 ; s. c. 4 Pat. exception to the general rule of law, hut
Rep. 1165, plaintiff was injured by is framing a new exception which does not
being thrown from a street-car which in fact rest upon the reason of the origi-
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nal exception,'and is based on fiction
and inconsistent with justice."
We find a still stronger denunciation
of the doctrine of Tiorogood v. Bryan
in Bennett v. N. J. Rd. & Tr. Co., 36
N. J. L. 225. The plaintiff while riding on a street car was injured by carelessness of engineer of defendant and
contributory negligence of driver of street
car. The plaintiff was held entitled to
recover. BEASLEY, C. ., in referring
to Thorogood v. Bryan, said, "This case
stands, I think, in point of principle,
alone in the line of English decisions,
and the grounds upon which it rests
seem to me inconsistent with familiar
rules. The reason given for the judgment is, that a passenger in the omnibus
must be considered as identified with the
driver of the omnibus in which he is voluntarily a passenger, and that the negligence of the driver is the neglipence of
the passenger. But I have entirely failed
to perceive how it is that the passenger
in a public conveyance becomes identified, in any legal sense, with the driver
of such conveyance. Such identification
could result only in one way; that is, by
considering such a driver the servant of
the plaintiff. I can see no ground upon
which such relationship is to hc founded.
In a practical point of view it certainly
does not exist. The passenger has no
control over the driver or agent in charge
of the vehicle. And it is this right to
control the conduct of tie agent, which
is the foundation of the doctrine that the
master is to be affected by the acts of his
servants. To hold that the conductor of
a street car or a railroad train is the
agent of the numerous passengers who
may chance to be in it, would be a pure
fiction. In reality there is no such agen"ey,and if we impute it, and correctly
apply legal principles, the passenger, on
the occurrence of an accident from the
carelessness of the person in charge of
the vehicle in which he is being conveyed, -iould be without any remedy. It is
obvious in a suit against the proprietor
VoL. =X 1I-90

of the car in which he was a passenger,
there could be no recovery if the driver
or conductor of such car, is to be regarded as the servant of such passenger.
And so, on the same ground, each passenger would be liable to every person
injured by the carelessness of such driver
or conductor ; because if the negligence
of such agent is to be attributed to the
passenger for one purpose, it would be
entirely arbitrary to say that he is not to
be affected by it for other purposes. * *
The doctrine of the English case appears
to convert the driver of the omnibus into
the servant of the passenger for the single purpose of preventing the passenger
from bringing suit against a third party
whose negligence had co-operated with
that of the driver in the production of
the injury. I am compelled to dissent
from such a position. Under the circumstances in question, the passenger is
a perfectly innocent party, having no
control over either of the wrongdoers ;
and I can see no reason why according
to the usual rule an action will not lie in
his behalf against either or both of the
employers of such wrongdoers."
Louisville, 4c., Rd. v. Case's Adi'r,
9 Bush (Ky.) 728, holds a contrary doctrine from Thorogood v. Bryan. Here
the passenger was in a street-car and lost
his life by collision of his car with a railroad train of defendant, occasioned by
concurring negligence of the driver of
street-car and the servants of defendant.
There was a recovery, as the driver was
held not to be a servant of the passenger,
nor subject to his government or control.
In this case it was said (p. 735), "Notwithstanding the driver of the street-car
may have recklessly driven across the
track of the rairroad company in dangerous proximity to the moving train,
still the servants of the company, so soon
as it became apparent that he intended
to do so, were under obligations to the
passengers on the street-car to use all
proper efforts to arrest the progress of
the train, and prevent, if possible, the
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collision; but as it is much more difficult
to control the movements of a heavy
train of cars than to check a single streetcar drawn by mules or horses, the employees of the railroad company could
not anticipate that the driver of the
street-car would attempt to cross the
street in the face of the advancing train,
and consequently could not be expected
to take steps to arrest an unexpected
danger until it became manifest that the
driver intended to act contrary to the
course usually adopted by persons of reasonable prudence under like circumstances. But the negligence of the driver
will not excuse negligence on the part of
the railroad employees. If the life of
Case was destroyed by the concurrent
negligence of two or more persons, none
of whom were acting as his agent or ser rant, nor subject to his government or
control, all the employers of the guilty
agents may be held responsible for the
injury, and one cannot plead the negligence of the servants of the other as
matter of defence in an action against
himself. This doctrine was announced
by this court in Stewart's Case, 2 Met.
(Ky.) 119, and it is in harmony with
the reason of the law, and we are not
inclined to depart from it, although a
different rule appears to have been followed in one English and a few American cases."
In Cuddy v. Born, 46 Mich. 596, (s.
0. 21 Am. L. Reg. N. S. 302, and note),
the injury was caused by collision of two
steamers, through mutual negligence of
managers of each. One of the vessels
had been chartered, but the charterer did
not control the movements of the boat.
The action was against the owners of
both vessels, and was sustained, citing
Colegrove v. Rd., 20 N. Y. 492 ; Cooper
v. E. T. Co., 79 Id. 116 ; Hillman v.
Newington, 57 Cal. 56.
PRIVATE CONVEYANCEs.-Many cases

have made a distinction between public
and private conveyances, but others have

refused to recognise any difference in the
principle of the doctrine.
The grounds for this distinction are
well stated by RYAN, C. J., in Prdeaux
v. M'ineral Point, 43 Wis. 513, 526. In
that case plaintiff was riding in a prirate conveyance at the invitation of the
driver, and it was held that the driver
was the agent of the plaintiff whose
negligence was imputable to him. RYAN,
C. J., said (p. 528), "One in a private
conveyance voluntarily trusts his personal safety in the conveyance to the person in control of it. Voluntary entrance
into a private conveyance adopts the
conveyance for the time being as one's
own, and assumes the risk of the skill
of the person guiding it. Pro hac vice,
the master of a private yacht or the driver of a private carriage is accepted as
agent by every person voluntarily committing himself to it. When paterfamilias drives his wife and child in his own
vehicle he is surely their agent in driving
them, to charge them with negligence.
It is difficult to perceive on what principle
he is less the agent of one who accepts
his or their invitation to ride with them.
There is a personal trust in such cases,
which implies an agency. So, several
persons voluntarily associating themselves to travel together in one conveyance, not only put a personal trust in
the skill of that one of them whom they
trust with the direction and control of
the conveyance, but appear to put a personal trust each in the direction of each
against negligence affecting the common
safety. One - enters a private conveyance in some sort of free choice ; voluptarily trusting to its sufficiency and
safety. It appears absurd that one voluntarily choosing to ride in a private
conveyance trusts to the sufficiency of
the highway, to the care and skill exercised in all other vehicles upon it, to the
care and skill governing trains at railroad crossings, to the care and skill of
everything except that which is most im-
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mediately important to himself, and
trusts nothing to the suffigiency of the
very vehicle in which he voluntarily travels, nothing to the care and skill of the
person in charge of it. His voluntary
entrance is an act of faith in the driver ;
by implication of law he accepts the driveras his agent to drive him. In the absence of express adjudication, the general rules of implied agency appears to
sanction this view." See Houfe v. E1lton, 29 Wis. 296. Otis v. Janesville, 47
Id. 422, follows Prideaux v. Mineral,
Pont, supra, and holds that the contributory negligence of the driver of a private
conveyance in which a person is voluntarily riding at the time of receiving an
injury from a defective highway, is imputable to the person so injured, to prevent a recovery.
This distinction has also been taken in
Michigan. In Lake Shore, 6C., Rid. v.
Miller, 25 Mih. 274, 287, a female servant was riding with her employer in his
wagon, which was wrecked by a railroad
train of defendant. The driver of the
wagon appeared to have been guilty of
negligence directly contributing to the
injury against which the plaintiff warned
him. This negligence was held to be
imputed to the plaintiff, so as to preclude
a recovery.
Iowa has also adopted this rule. [n
Payne v. C., R. .&"P. Rd., 39 Iowa
523, the action was for injuries received
at a railroad crossing of defendant by
collision of a wagon with defendants'
train. The wagon was driven by a third
person and plaintiff was a voluntary
passenger therein. It was held that the
plaintiff was bound to rely upon the diligence of the driver for a recovery.
This distinction was adopted in one
New York case-Brown v. N. Y. Cent.
Rd., 31 Barb. 385-but denied in others.
. 4- H. R. Rd., 66
In Robinson v. N
N. Y. 11, a female accepted an invitation to ride in a buggy with a person
who was entirely competent to manage
the horses. While crossing the defend-
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ant's railroad track the buggy collided
with defendantis train. It was held that
if she was free from negligence herself,,
she was entitled to recover, although the
driver might be guilty of negligence
which contributed to the injury. This
case is criticised by RYs.t, C. J., in
Prideauxv. Mineral Point, supra.
The Noew York case, Robinson v. Rd.
supra, is approved in Dyer v. Erie Ry.
71 N. Y. 228. In that case plaintiff
was injured while crossing defendants'
railroad track in a public thoroughfare,
while riding by permission and invitation
of a third person, the owner of the horses
and wagon driven. It was held that as
no relationship of principal and agen
arose between the plaintiff and the driver of the vehicle, the former was not
responsible for the negligence of the latter, where he himself is not chargeable
with negligence, and where there is no
claim that the driver was not competent
to control and manage the train. This
case affirms that of Robinson v. Rd., supra,and puts this principle at rest in New
York.
In Metcaifv. Baker, 11 Abb. Pr. Rep.
(N. S.) 431; s. c. 2 Jones& Sp. 10,
plaintiff was riding gratuitously in A.'s
carriage, who was driving at the time of
the accident, which was caused by collision of A.'s carriage with defendant's
wagon, which was driven by defendant's
servant. Both drivers contributed to the
injury. The plaintiff was held entitled to
yeeover, citing and approving Coleqrove
v. N. Y. g H. R. Rd., 6 Duer 382;
. 0. 20 N. Y. 492.

In Knapp v. Dag9, 18 How. Prac.
165, plaintiff was riding as a passenger
in her brother's wagon, when they met
and collided with the defendant's wagon,
she being thrown out and injured, the
accident beingoccasioned bymutual negligence of both drivers, without any blame
on part of plaintiff unless in riding with
a careless driver. She was held not to
be chargeable with the negligence of her
driver. The court said (p. 165) : "The
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plaintiff is not chargeable with the negligence of the driver of the team after
which she rode. She could have sued
him for the injury she has sustained. The
defendant is guilty of injuring her as
well as he is.
They have severally
wronged her. She might sue either."
It was said in Brown v. Rd., supra,
that this case was not good law, but
Robinson v. Rd. supra, and Dryer v.
Erie Ry., supra, settle the rule this way
in N. Y.

The principal case fully sustains the
New York rule.
EUGENE MCQUILLEN.
[Since the receipt of the above note
a decision of the Court of Errors and
Appeals of New Jersey has been published in which that court also declines to
adopt the rule laid down in Thorogood v.
Bryan. See N. Y., L. E. 4- West. Rd. v.
Steinbrenner, 18 Vroom 161, ante, p.
684.-ED.)
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GLIDDEN v. HENRY.
A promissory note containing the clause, "the drawers and endorsers* * *
expressly agree that the payee or his assignees may extend the time of payment
thereof from time to time, indefinitely, as he or they may see fit," is non-negotiable.

APPEAL from Henry Circuit Court.

iVTillett & Bundy, for appellant.
J. M. Morris, for appellee.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
ZOLLARS, J.-For value, and before maturity, appellee be'came
the owner of two promissory notes executed by appellant, one of

which is as follows:
$750.
New Castle, Ind., April 14th 1883.
Twelve months after date we, or either of us, promise to pay to
,the order of George W. Nugen, Jr., seven hundred and fifty dollars,
with interest at the rate of seven per cent. per annum, after date,
until paid, and attorney fees, value received, without any relief
whatever from valuation or appraisement laws, with eight per cent
interest from maturity. The drawers and endorsers severally waive
presentment for payment, protest and notice of protest and nonpayment of this note, and further, expressly agree that the payee
or his assignees may extend the time of payment thereof from time
to time, indefinitely, as he or they may see fit, and receive interest
in advance, or otherwise, from the maker or endorsers, for any
extension or forbearance so made. Negotiable and payable at the
Citizens' State Bank of New Castle.
J. W. GLIDDEN.
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So far as is material here, the other note is the same. Appellee
brought this action to recover the amount of the notes, and to foreclose the mortgage given by appellant to secure them. The questions for decision are presented by the ruling of the court below in
sustaining a demurrer to appellant's answers, and the assignment
here that that ruling was erroneous. If the notes are negotiable
as inland bills of exchange, the demurrer was properly sustained,
because the defences set up in the answers are such as cannot be
made as against the bona fide holder of such paper. We are therefore met at the threshold with the question, are these notes negotiable
as inland bills of exchange? In section 5506, Rev. St. 1881, it is
provided that "notes payable to order or bearer, in a bank in this
state, shall be negotiable as inland bills of exchange, and the payees and endorsees thereof may recover as in case of such bills."
This statute does not provide what shall constitute a promissory note.
The term "note" is used as it was under the law-merchant in the
commercial world: Melton v. Gribson, 97 Ind. 158. The sole purpose of the section was to put a limitation upon section 5503, and
provide for commercial paper that might circulate free from defences
in favor of the maker. This is accomplished by the provision thatj
if the note be payable at a bank in this state, it shall be negotiable
as inland bills of exchange. The note, then with the addition prescribed by the statute, must be such as would have been negotiable
under the law-merchant without any statutory provision. Are the
notes in suit such as would have been thus negotiable? A standard author has said : "To learn what qualities are essential to a
negotiable promissory note, we must bear in mind the purpose of
the note, and of the law in relation to it. This is simply that the
note may represent money, and do all the work of money in business transactions. For this purpose, the first requisite-that, indeed,
which includes all the rest-is certainty. This means certainty.* * * Second, as to the person or persons who are to make this payment, and the order and conditions of their liability. * * * Fourth,
as to the time when payment is to be made. * * * It will be seen
that the haw endeavors to enforce, define and protect all these certainties as far as possible," &c. Par. Bills & Notes 80. See, also,
1 Daniel Neg. Inst. § 41. This same general doctrine of the books
is recognised by this and all other courts: Walker v. Woollen, 54
Ind. 164. In this case it was said: "A note, in order that it may
be negotiable in accordance with the law-merchant, must be payable
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unconditionally and at all events, and at some fixed period of time,
or upon some event which must inevitably happen."
Were it necessary we might cite numerous decisions by this court
asserting the general doctrine of certainty as necessary to a promissory note under the law merchant. The difficulty is not as to
the general doctrine, but the application of it to each case as it
arises. In the case before us, all parts of the note must be looked
to in determining the quality of the paper. There is a promise to
pay in twelve months, but that promise is not certain and unconditional. The other clause is that the time of piyment may be
extended indefinitely, as the parties may agree. From an inspection of the note, it is impossible to tell when it may mature, because
it is impossible to know what extension may have been or may hereafter be agreed upon. No definite time is fixed, nor is the maturity
of the note dependent upon an event that must inevitably happen.
The condition is, not that something may happen or be done that
will mature the note before the time named, thus leaving that time
as fixed and certain, if the thing do not happen or be not done, but
the condition is that the time named may be displaced by another
uncertain and indefinite time, as the parties may agree. This distinguishes the case from some of the cases cited by appellee, which
hold that so long as a definite time of payment, as fixed in the
note, remains fixed and certain, the note retains its negotiability,
although by certain agreed conditions it may be matured before that
time. The case here is also distinguishable from another class of
cases which hold that the time of payment may be dependent upon
an event that must inevitably happen, such as the death of the
maker, the coming of the seasons, &c.
The precise question involved here has been passed upon by the
Supreme Courts of Iowa and Michigan, and in each case it was
held that the condition destroyed the negotiability of the note:
Woodbury v. Boberts, 59 Iowa 348; Smith v. Van Blarcom, 45
Mich. 371 ; see, also, Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108; Gillilanv.
Myers, 31 Ill. 525; Uo8telo v. Crowell, 127 Mass. 293. We conclude from the foregoing that the notes in suit are not negotiable
under the statute as inland bills of exchange, and that, therefore,
whatever defences appellant might have set up and made available
as against Nugen, the payee, he may set up and make available as
against appellee. Appellee concedes that the first answer is sufficient
if the notes in his hands are subject to defences by appellant. A
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holding, therefore, that the notes are thus subject to defences, is a
holding that the court below erred in sustaining the demurrer to all
of the answers. Appellant's counsel have directed the whole of
their argument to the proposition that the notes are open to defences,
and have said nothing in support of the answers. The first answer
is clearly good, as it sets up an entire want of consideration for the
notes. For the sustaining of the demurrer to this answer, the judgment must be reversed. There is nothing in the notes nor in the
mortgage that can operate as an estoppel, as against appellant, to
make this defence.
As there is no discussion of the other answers, we observe simply
that the second answer, setting up an extension of the time of payment, is not good as a plea in bar. If such an extension may be
made available, as we think it may be in this case, it should be
brought forward as a plea in abatement. And under our present
statute (section 365, Rev. St. 1881) such answer must precede, and
cannot be pleaded with, an answer in bar. As to the third answer,
in which there was an attempt to make available as a defence the
fact that Kugen was not the owner of an undivided one-third of the
land covered by the mortgage, it is sufficient to say that the plea
does not make a defence either upon the ground of fraud, or upon
the ground that there was a breach of warranty.
The judgment is reversed with costs.
was held that it was not, and consequently the note was not negotiable.
Story says a note "must be payable
absolutely, and at all events, and not be
a specified sum at a time therein limited,
subject to any condition or contingency :"
or on demand, or at sight, to a perStory on Notes, sect. 20-22.
son therein named, or to his order, or to
" It is an essential requisite of a prothe bearer :" Drake v. Markle, 21 Ind.
missory note, that there must be certainty
435, citing Byles on Bills 4. This is
as to the fact of payment. It must be
substantially the definition of the books
and cases: Daniels on Negotiable Instru- payable at all events, and not dependent
upon a condition or contingency :" Titments, sect. 30 : Story on Notes, sects.
20-22 ; Benjamin Chalmers's Digest,
low v. liHubard, 63 ind. 8 ; Hays v.
art. 271 ; Htras v. Gwin, 19 Ind. 19;
Gwin, 19 Id. 21.
Miller v. Atsten, 13 How. (U. S.) 218
"A note, in order that it be negotiable
I Pars. Notes and Bills 42 ; Chitty on
in accordance with the law-merchant,
must be payable unconditionally, and at
Bills 134.
Requisite as to time of Payment.-The all events, and at some fixed period of
principal case turned upon the question
time, or upon some event which must inwhether or not the time of payment was
evitably happen :1 Walker v. Woollen,
made certain by the words used; and it
54 Ind. 166; Walters v. Short, 10 Ill.
Speaking of a promissory note, it was
said that -it must be an absolute promisein writing, signed, but not sealed, to pay
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259 ; Whzteman v. Bliss, 24 Id. 170;
Cook v. Satterlee, 6 Cow. 108.
"A written engagement by one person, to pay absolutely and unconditionally to another person therein named, or
to his order, or to the bearer, a certain
sum of money, at a specified time, or on
demand, or at sight :" Hall v. Famner,
5 Denio 486.
In the view of this rule, what instruments have and have not been held negotiable with reference to the time of
payment?
Karst.-A bill or note may be payable
on demand, as "when demanded," or
"I at any time when called for :" Kingsbury
v. Butler, 4 Vt. 458:
Bunan v.
Mchesney, 22 Gratt. 609. Or it may
be payable "in such instalments, and at
such time as B. (the payee) may require ;" this being nothing more than
tle demand of the payee, and if complied
with is a payment on demand: Whitev.
Smith, 77 I11.351. In the case cited the
note was payable in such instalments as
the directors of the payee company might
assess or require ; see also ProtectionIns.
Co. v. Bill, 31 Conn. 534. And a note
payable in instalments not to exceed ten
per cent. on each note, at thirty days,
notice of call from board of directors was
upheld; Stiliell T. Craig, 58 Mo. 24 ;
also, a note " payable in such manner
and proportion, and at such time and
place as B. shall require," being payable on demand: Goshen v. Hurtin, 9
Johns. 217 ; see Washington Co. Mutual
Ins. Co. v. Miller, 26 Vt. 77. But not
to pay at such times, and in such articles
as A. may need for support: Corbitt v.
Stonemetz, 15 WVis.170. Payable '1 on
demand, with interest after four months"
is good : Loring v. Gurney, 5 Pick. 15.
See First Net. Bank v. ice, 52 Iowa
570 ; Hobart v. Dodge, I Fairf. (Me.)
156. If no time of payment is specified, it
is understood that the note is payable on
demand : Thompson v. Kecham, 8 Johns.
189 ; Abbott v. Douglass, I C. B. 491 ;
Herrick v. Bennett, 8 Johns. 374; Al-

dous v. Cornwell, L. R., 3 Q. B. 573;
Gaylord v. Van Loan, 15 Wend. 308;
tWitlock v. Underwood, 2 B. & C.
157 ; Cornell v. Moulton, 3 Denio 12 ;
Stover v. Hamilton, 21 Gratt. 273; Keyes
v. Fensternmaker, 24 Cal. 329 ; Green v.
Drehillis, I Ia. 552 ; 1'reman v. Roberts,
15 Ga. 215 ; Dodd v. Denny, 6 Ore.
157 ; Kendall v. Galvin, 15 Me. 131;
Bacon v. Page, 1 Conn. 404; Jones v.
Brown, 11 Ohio St. 601 ; Porterv. Porter, 51 Me. 376. And if payable" months after date," it is payable on demand : McLean v. Nichlen, 3 Victorian
L. R. 107.

Second.-A note or bill may be payable "at sight" or at a certain fixed
period "after sight." (This term is seldom applied to a note.) The instrument
is payable at sight when it is expressed
to be so payable, or "on presentation,"
or" on demand at sight :" Dixon v. N'uttall, I Cr., M. & R. 307. So a promise
to pay a certain sum after six months'
notice is good; for a time certain may
be fixed by giving notice: Walker v.
Roberts, Car. & Marsh. 590 ; Gaytes v.
Hibbard,5 Biss. 99 ; Dutchess Co. v. Davis, 14 Johns. 238.

Tldird.-A bill or note may be made
payable at a fixed future time; at a
fixed period after date ; at a fixed future
period after sight; or at a time certain
to transpire though indefinite ; Colehan
v. Cooke, Willes 393 ; Cota v. Buck, 7
Met. 588.
The time, however, when the note is
payable, must certainly come, although
the particular day need not be mentioned
in the note. Thus the following has been
-held not to render a note non-negotiable:
"I promise to pay A., or bearer, one
hundred dollars, one year from date,
with annual interest ; and if there is not
enough realized by good management in
one year, to have more time to pay, in
the manufacture of the plaster bed on
B.'sland." It was said that the only
uncertainty was as to the length of time
to be given, and that "uncertainty the
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law makes certain by giving him a reasonable time thereafter (the time prescribed) to make the payment :" Capron
v. Capron, 44 Vt. 420.
Likewise a note was held to be negotiable that provided that it was "to be
paid as soon as collected from my accounts at B. ;" for the phrase did not
make the debt conditional, but only provided that a reasonable time was to be
allowed for the collection of the accounts:
Ubsdell v. Cunningham, 22 Mo. 124.
So a note payable on demand after date
"when convenient" was held valid and
payable absolutely in a reasonable time:
Works v. Hershey, 35 Ia. 340; Lewis
v. Tipton, 10 Ohio St. 88; so a note
payable " as soon as I can:" Kincardv.
Biggins, 1 Bibb (Ky.) 396. A note
payable "from the avails of logs bought
of B., when there is a sale made :"
Sears v. W1'right, 24 Ale. 278 ; or" when
I sell my place where I now live," has
been held, in Maine, payable absolutely
after a reasonable time: Crooker v.
Holmes, 65 Me. 195. Likewise, a note
payable in six months, "or as soon as I
can with due diligence make the money
out of said patent right :" Palmer v.
Hfummer, 10 Kans. 464; s. c. 15 Am.
Rep. 353; contra, Hubbardv. .foscly, I1
Gray 170; or "as B.'s horse earns the
money in the cavalry service ;" Gardner
v. Barger, 4 Heisk. 669 ; "1or sooner
if made out of a certain sale' I Ernst v.
Steckman, 74 Penn. St. 13; s. c. 15
Am. Rep. 542; Woollen v. Ulrich, 64
Ind. 120; iNrollv. Smith, Id. 511 ; Cornell v. Neebeker, 58 Id. 425 ; 11'alker
v.
Woollen, 54 Id. 165 ; s. c. 23 _Am. Rep.
639 ; Cisne v. Chidester, 85 IlL. 523 ; has
been held negotiable : Charlton v. Reed,
61 Ia. 166 ; s.c. 47 Am. Rep. 808.
A note payable "1as soon as realized,"
to which was added, "to be paid in the
course of the season now coming, was
held to be an undertaking to pay absolutely. It was said: "Whatever time
maybe understood by the coming season,
whether harvest-time or the coming year,
VOL. 1=XIII.-91

it must come by mere lapse of time, and
that must be the ultimate limit of the
time

of payment :"

Cota

v.

Buck,

7 Met. 588. Likewise a certificate payable "on the return of this certificate,"
is negotiable : but adding "and the return of my guaranty" of a certain note
engrafts a collateral condition which defeats the negotiability of the instrument:
Smilie v. Stevens, 39 Vt. 316 ; Blood v.
Northup, I Kans. 29.
So a note may be expressed to be payable, in effect, in a reasonable time. Illustrations of this rule have elsewhere
been given. Thus a note payable "when
convenient" was upheld ; for the court
could say what is a reasonable time, and
the phrase used meant nothing else:
Capron v. Capron, 44 Vt. 410; (contra,
Nunez v. Dautel, 19 Wall. 560) ; Work
v. Hershey, 35 Ia. 340 ; Lewis v. Tipton,
10 Ohio St. 88; (contra, Ex parte
Tooltell, 4 Ves. 372. Or "when I sell
my place :" Crooker v. Holmes, 65 Me.
195 ; or "to be paid as soon as collected
from my accounts at P. :I Ubsdall v. Cunningham, 22 Mo. 124. As we have seen
a note payable when A. becomes of age,
is non-negotiable, for he may never attain his majority ; but if the date of that
prospective attainment were mentioned
it would be different: Goss v. Nelson,
I Burr. 226. But a note payable at or
within a certain time after a man's death
is not objectionable, for the man will
certainly die : Cooke v. Colehan, 2 Stra.
1217 ; Colehan v. Cooke, Willes 393;
Raffey v. Greenwell, 10 A. & E. 222;
Conn v. Thornton, 46 Ala. 587; Mortee
v. Edwards, 20 La. Ann. 236; even if
made payable after the death of the
maker: Bristol v. Warner, 19 Conn.
7; as "one day after date, or at my
death :" Conn v. Thornton, 46 Ala. 587.
In England a note made payable a
certain time after a government-ship is
paid off was held valid ; for the government is sure to pay: Andrews v. Franklin, 1 Stra. 24; Evans v. Underwood, 1
Wils. 262. But this case has been se-
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verely criticised in this country: I Pars.
N. & B. 40; Edwards on Bills & Notes
142.
So a negotiable note may be made payable in instalments, and provide that
if there is a failure to pay any one instalment when due, the whole note shall
It is like a
become due and collectible.
note or bill payable a certain time after
sight : Carlonv. Kenealy, 12 M. & W.
139. See Miller v. Biddle, 13 L. T.
Rep. 334, and Wrightv. Irwin, 33 Mich.
32; Cooke v. Horne, 29 L. T. (N. S.)
369 ; Sea v. Glover, I Bradw. 335. So
a note payable in the sum of one hun"
dred dollars by two equal instalments,
due Aug. 1st and Oct. 1st," is valid :
Garkins v. Davis, 2 F. & F. 294; see
Saunders v. McCarthy, 8 Allen 42 ; or
"in such manner and proportion, and at
.. such a time and place as he shall require,"
as we have seen: Whdte v. Smith, 77 Ill.
351 ; see Colgate v. Buckingham, 39
Barb. 177 ; but not "by instalments,"
not stating date: Mo.ffatt v. Edwards, 1
Car. & M. 16. So a note payable " to
B. or order, $1000, by ten equal instalments, payable, &c., all instalments to
cease on the death of A.," is invalid:
Worley v. Harrison, 3 A. & E. 669.
During the late Rebellion, notes were
given sometimes payable a certain time
after peace, or when peace should be deThus a note payable "six
clared.
months after peace is declared between
the United States and the Confederate
States of America," was held actionable
six months after peace ensued • Brewster
v. Williams, 2 S. 0. 455; Mortee v.
Edwards, 20 La. Ann. 236; Gaines v.
Dorsett, 18 Id. 563. But this view has
been denied: MeNinch v. Ramsey, 66 N.
C. 229 ; and it may well he doubted if
they are negotiable : I Daniels Neg.
Inst. sect. 49.
If a note is payable at a time certain,
its negotiability is not destroyed because
it is payable on or before that time; or
"on or before one year from date :"
Helmer v. Krolici, 36 Mich. 371. "The

legal rights of the holder are clear and
certain ; the note is due at a time fixed,
and it is not due before. True, the
maker may pay sooner if lie shall choose,
but this option if exercited would be a
payment in advance of the legal liability
to pay, and nothing more. Notes like
this are common in commercial transactions, and we are not aware that their
negotiability is ever questioned in busiIt ought not to be
ness dealings.
questioned for the sake of any distinction
that does not rest upon reason :" M3attison v. Marks, 31 Mich. 421, 18 Am.
Rep. 197 ; Jordoan v. Tate, 19 Ohio St.
586: Smith v. Ellis, 29 Me. 422; Curtis v. Horn, 58 N. H. 504; Ernst v.
Steckman, 74 Penn. St. 17; s. c. 15
Am. Rep. 542. The doctrine of these
cases applies to the case of a note payable
by May 10th "or when A. completes" a
certain building "according to contract,"
for the time fixed, May 10, is the ultimate day when it falls due: Stevens v.
Blunt, 7 Mass. 240 ; Goodloe v. Taylor,
3 Hawks-458.
A note given for a machine and containing the clause that "the payee or his
endorsee has full power to declare this
note due and take full possession of said
property at any time .they may deem
themselves insecure, even before the maturity of this note, and sell the same
where this note is payable, on five days'
notice in writing," is not negotiable
because the amount recoverable is uncertain: Smith v. Marland, 59 Ia. 645 ; see
Deering v. Thom, 29 Minn. 120.
So the negotiability of a note payable
"on or before two years from date," is
destroyed by a memorandum attached
thereto providing that if paid within one
year, there shall be no interest ; because
the amount is uncertain: Lamb v.
Story, 45 Mich. 488.
If a note is payable only on condition
that certain terms be complied with, it is
Such is the case if the
non-negotiable
note is made payable, if a certain railroad be built to a certain point by a time
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named: Blackian v. Lehman, 63 Ala.
547 : Eldred v. Malloy, 2 Col. 320 ; or
if a certain act be done : Appleby v.
Beddolph, 8 Mod. 363; or if another
person shall not previously pay : Roberts
v. Peake, 1 Burr. 323; or if a certain
receipt be produced : Mason v. Metcalf,
4 Bax. 440 ; (contra, Frank v. IWVessels,
64 . Y. 158), because return of the receipt was not the essence of the contract ;
or if a certain ship shall arrive : Coolidge v. Ruggler, 15 Mass. 387: Palmer
v. Pratt, 2 Bing. 185 ; Grant v. Wood,
12 Gray 220; see Pinkham v. Macy, 9
Met. 174 ; or if the maker be able: Ex
parte Tooltell, 4 Yes. 372; Salimas v.
Uiright, 11 Tex. 572; or "when A. shall
marry :" Pearson v. Garrett, 4 31od.
242 ; Beardsley v. Baldwin, Stra. 1157 ;
or " when a certain sale is made :" De
Forest v. Frary, 6 Cow. 151 ; Hill v.
.talford, 2 B. & P. 413 ; " or when a
certain suit is determined :" Shelton v.
Bruce, 9 Ga. 24; "or certain divisions disclosed:" Brooks v. Hargreaves,
21 Mich. 255 ; or "when the estate of
A. is settled up:" Husband v. Epling,
81 Ill. 172 ; or upon an event not inevitable: Tradesman's Bank v. Green, 57
Md. 602 ; or "when a certain amount is
collected :" Corbett v. State, 24 Ga. 287 ;
or " after arrival and discharge of coal by
the brig C. :" Grant v. Wood, 12 Gray
220 ; or" payable subject to the policy :"
American Exchange Bank v. Blanchard,
7 Allen 332 ; or subject to a certain contract; Cushing v. Field, 70 Me. 50 ; or
"as per agreement :" Bank of Sherman
v. Apperson, 4 Fed. Rep. 25 ; (contra,
Jury v. Barker, El., El. & El. 459) ;
or "given as collateral security with an
agreement :" Costello v. Crowell, 127
Mass. 293. In each of these instances
the note was held non-negotiable; for
the events upon which the maturity of
the note depends may never happen.
So an instrument payable in instalments, where no time for the instalments
falling due is told, is not a negotiable
note: Moffat v. Edwards, Car. & M.

16. In England a note payable ninety
days after sight or when realized, was
held not to e a note ; as we have seen
it has been held otherwise in this country: Alexander v. Thomas, 16 Q. B.
333.
So a note payable when a certain
party arrives at age, is not negotiable;
and it makes no difference that be is of
age at the time of suit : Kelley v.Hemmingn'ay, 13 II1. 604 ; and the same is
true if made payable six months after
the dissolution of the partnership between
A. & B., and the settling of the books:
Sackett v. Palmer, 25 Barb. 179; or
when a certain building is completed:
Miller v. Excelsior Stone Co., I Bradw.
(I1.) 273; see Stevens v. Blount, 7
Mass. 240.)
So a note given with a mortgage payable in a year, or a year and a half from
date " or sooner, at the option of the
mortgagor, with interest at six per cent.
during the term of the mortgage," is not
negotiable ; for it is not payable at a
definite time, or at a time that can be
made definite at the election of the
holder: Stults v. Silva, 119 Mass. 137 ;
Way v. Smith, 111 Id. 523. Likewise
of bonds issued by a company containing
the clause " The company reserve the
right to pay the same at any time by
adding to the principal a sum equal to
twenty per cent. thereof:" Chouteau v.
Allen, 70 Mo. 339.
So a note payable on the happening
of two events, one of which may not
happen, is not negotiable: Massie v.
Belford, 68 111. 290 ; and the same is
true if a part of it is for a sum certain
and a part upon a contingency : Palmer
v. Ward, 6 Gray 340.
The principal case is amply supported
by the cases cited in the opinion. In
Smith v.Van Blarcum, cited, it was said :
"There is nothing on the face of the
note whereby any one can tell, either
directly or by reference to any particular
event, at what period this paper will
become absolutely payable. We cannot
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conceive how this can be treated as not
payable on a contingency."
This is
supported by Woodbury v. Roberts,
cited; s. c. 44 Am. Rep. 685. Of
a note in another instance it was said:
"This divests it of the quality of certainty in the time of paymetit, which,
as we have shown, is one of the essential
elements of negotiability. The time of
payment may be lessened at the option
of the payee, and is therefore uncertain."
This note contained a clause allowing

the payee to declare the note due at any
time he deemed himself insecure; and it
was held non-negotiable: First Nat.
Bank v. Bynum, 84 N. C. 24; s. c. 37
Am. Rep. 604. See Morgan v. Edwards, 53 Wis. 599 ; s. c. 40 Am. Rep
781; Mahoney v. Fitzpatrick, 133 Mass.
151; 43 Am. Rep. 502; Miller v.
Poage, 56 Ia. 96; s. c. 41 Am. Rep.
82.
W. W. ToRNToX.

Supreme Court of Iowa.
VIMONT v. CHICAGO AND N. W. RAILWAY CO.
A cause of action for a tort is assignable so as to vest in the assignee a right of
action in his own name.
- J., who was injured by the negligence of defendant railroad company, assigned
his claim for damages to V., who executed the following agreement: "In consideration of the assignment to me by C. 0. Johnson of his claim for damages against
the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, resulting to him by reason of an
injury received by him on or about the thirty-first day of August 1881, on said railway, I hereby agree to dispose of the entire amount realized on said claim as follows :
For my own compensation in and about the prosecution of said claim, and for the
use of any advances of money I may make I am to retain thereof the sum of fifty
dollars ; I am also to retain all sums of money that I may advance in the prosecution of said claim ; next, I agree to pay out of the proceeds of said recovery the
reasonable fee of the attorneys and agents employed to prosecute said claim on such
fee therefor as may be agreed upon, if any agreement for a specific amount shall be
agreed upon, and the balance of said recovery I agree to pay to the said C. 0.
Johnson."
Held, that the cause of action was assignable ; that the assignment and
agreement did not constitute barratry. champerty, or maintenance ; and that V. was
entitled to maintain an action for damages against the railway company in his own
name.
In such an action, even if it should appear that the assignment was colorable and
fraudulent, the assignor need not be made a party to the action.
Where an assignment of a cause of action is legal and valid, the fact that it was
made for the express purpose of depriving defendant of the right to remove the caso
to a federal court on the ground of citizenship, will not invalidate it or entitle defendant to such removal.

APPEAL from Polk Circuit Court.

The plaintiff, as assignee of one Johnson, brought this action to
recover damages for a tort committed by the defendant. The latter
moved the court to require Johnson to be made a party to the action.
This motion was overruled, and the defendant appeals. The latter

VIMONT v. CHICAGO & N. W. RAILWAY CO.

afterwards filed a motion to transfer the cause to the federal court.
This motion was sustained, and the plaintiff appealed.
Bourse d. Kauffman, for plaintiff.
.N

. Hubbard and W. S. 2U. Clark, for defendant.

The opinion of the court was delivered by.
SEEVERS, J.-As to the defendant's appeal.-The petition states
that C. 0. Johnson was a passenger on one of the defendant's trains,
and because of the negligence of the defendant he was injured and
entitled to recover damages therefor. The nature and extent of
the injuries are stated, and that Johnson had assigned his claim and
right of action to the plaintiff, wherefor judgment was asked. The
defendant pleaded: First, a general denial of the allegations of the
petition; second, "that the assignment was colorable, collusive,
and fraudulent, and made for the purpose of depriving defendant
of its right to remove the cause to the federal court;" and, third,
"that the assignment of the claim by Johnson, together with the
assignment executed at the same time by Vimont, constitutes barratry, champerty and maintenance, and is void for that reason."
The agreement executed by the plaintiff at the tim the assignmeAt
was made is in these words:
"In consideration of the assignment to me by 0. 0. Johnson
of his claim for damages against the Chicago & Northwestern Railway Company, resulting to him by reason of an injury received by
him on or about the thirty-first day of August 1881, on said railway, I hereby agree to dispose of the entire amount realized on said
claim as follows: For my own compensation in and about the prosecution of said claim, and for the use of any advances of money- I
may make I am to retain thereof the sum of fifty dollars. I am
also to retain all sums of money that I may advance in the prosecution of said claim. Next, I agree to pay out of the proceeds of
said recovery the reasonable fee of the attorneys and agents employed
to proseaute said claim, or such fee thereof as may be agreed upon,
if an agreement for a specific amount shall be agreed upon. And
the balance of said recovery I agree to pay to the said C; 0. Johnson.

WM. H. YIMONT."

The defendant also pleaded that the assignment was made and
completed in Illinois, and that by the laws of that state the assign-
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ment is void, and that it is illegal and void under the laws of Iowa.
The defendant moved the court to make an order requiring said
Johnson to be made a party plaintiff, on the ground that no determination of the controversy could be made unless said Johnson was
a party to the record. And, in support of the motion, the defendant introduced the deposition of the plaintiff showing the agreement
taken back at the time of the assignment was as above set forth :
"That the plaintiff paid said Johnson no money, and don't know
him; that the assignment was procured by his attorneys, Nourse &
Kauffman-Mr. Nourse being his brother-in-law; that he had no
knowledge of this claim prior to receiving information in regard to
it from Nourse & Kauffman."
Is an action for a tort assignable so as to vest in the assignee a
right of action in his own name ? In Weire v. City of Davenport,
11 Iowa 49, it was held that a right of action for a tort could be
sold and transferred at common law, and in Gray v. icCallister,
50 Iowa 497, it was held that a claim for a personal tort, which
dies with the party, could be sold or transferred like any other
cause of action. See, also, Small v. Railroad Co., 50 Iowa 338.
We are not disposed to depart from the rule established in these
cases, therefore the assignment in this case is valid under the law
of this state. The laws of Illinois were not introduced in evidence
in this case and are not, therefore, before us. -In the absence of
proof to the contrary it must be presumed that the laws of that
state are the same as those of Iowa. This we have held in several
cases.
The assignment of the claim vested the legal title thereto in the
plaintiff. Being such owner, he legally is the real party in interest,
and the statute requires that the action for the, recovery of such
claim must be brought in the name of the said party. Code,
§ 2543. But it is urged that the assignment is colorable, and does
not vest the right to maintain this action in the plaintiff, because
of the agreement made at the time of the assignment whereby he
agreed to pay a portion of the amount recovered and realized to Johnson, the assignor. If the assignment vested the legal title to the
claim in the plaintiff it would seem that, ordinarily, he, as such
owner, should have the right to do what he pleas.ed with it. Besides
this we understand this identical question was made and determined
in Knadler v. Sharp, 36 Iowa 232, adversely to the defendant,
and no adequate reasons having been adduced why that case should
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be overruled we therefore follow it. We may further remark that
it was held in Small v. Railroad Co., before cited, that champerty,
and maintenance are not a defence to the action. We therefore are
-f the opinion the plaintiff can maintain this action.
It is said as it may be determined the assignment is colorable,
fraudulent, and void, that a complete determination of this case
cannot be made unless Johnson is made a party. Johnson filed a
paper in response to the motion in which he disclaimed any interest
in the prosecution of this acti6n, and stated in substance that hb
did not own the claim, but that he had assigned it to the plaintiff.
If it should be determined on the trial, that the defendant had not
been negligent, such adjudication would be binding on Johnson,
and the controversy would be finally ended; but, if the plaintiff
should be defeated on the ground that he did not own the claim, or
that the assignment was colorable and fraudulent, it may be that
Johnson could maintain an action thereon. "The court may determine any controversy between parties before it, when it can be done
without prejudice to the rights of others, or by saving their rights:
but when a determination of the controversy between the parties
before the court cannot be made without the presence of other parties the court mast order them to be brought in :" Code, § 2551.
The rights of others cannot be prejudiced by whatever determination is made between these parties. Those of Johnson certainly
cannot be, but if they should, he would clearly be estopped from
complaining. It is urged, however, that the defendant would be
prejudiced if compelled to again litigate the questions involved
with Johnson.
We do not think, conceding this to be so, that such prejudice
would be of a legal character, for the reason that the statute does
not seem to so contemplate. In actions at law, if the controversy
can be determined, without prejudice to the rights of others, between
the parties to the action, this, ordinarily, is all that can be required.
The motion, therefore, was properly overruled.
As to the plaintiff's appeal. After the determination of the
foregoing motion the defendant filed a petition for the removal of this
action to the federal court. It is in the following words : "That
the defendant is, and was at the date of the commencement of this
suit, a citizen of the state of Illinois; that William H. Vimont,
plaintiff herein, was also, at and ever since the commencement of
this suit, has beeh a citizen of the state of Illinois; that 0. 0.
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Johnson is the real party plaintiff, and is the party that received
the injury ; and that for the sole purpose of avoiding the jurisdiction of the federal court, said Johnson made said pretended assignment of said claim to said William H Vimont, and received back
the written contract set out in defendant's answer; that said assignment and contract were made in Illinois, and that, by the laws of
the state of Illinois, the assignment is invalid and'insufficient for
said William H. Vimont to maintain an action thereon in the state
of Illinois; that the assignment and contract between said Vimont
and said Johnson are barratrous and champertous, and against public policy and void, as appears by defendant's answer herein; that
said C. 0. Johnson is the real party in interest as plaintiff, and was,
at and before the commencement of this suit, and still is, a citizen
of the state of Iowa, and prays that said 0. 0. Johnson be made a
party plaintiff in this suit; that there is and was. at the date of the
commencement of this suit a controversy between petitioner and
.the said Johnson, the real plaintiff, and that the matter in dispute
exceeds, exclusive of costs, the sum of five hundred dollars, and
that the present term of this court is the first term at which the
case could be tried. *' * * Petitioner offers a bond with surety and

prays," the court to order the action to be removed, &c.
The act of Congress under which the removal is sought, provides
that where there is a controversy between the citizens of different
states, and the amount in controversy exceeds $500, exclusive of
costs, the action may be removed from the state to the federal court.
Does the record show that there is such a controversy? We have'
held that Johnson is not a necessary party, but that the plaintiff can
maintain this action. It then follows, we think, that there is not,
and cannot be in this action any controversy except between the
plaintiff and defendant, who are both residents of Illinois, and
therefore, as between them, the right of removal does not exist.
But counsel for the defendant claim that it appears from the record
that the assignment of the claim by Johnson to the plaintiff was
made for the express purpose of depriving the defendant of the
right to remove the action to the federal court. The petition for
the removal so states. But the plaintiff, in what is designated as an
answer thereto, denied that Johnson was the real plaintiff, and denied that the assignment was made for the purpose stated in the
answer. Rut it is said that we can only look to the facts stated in
the petition, and must disregard anything stated by the plaintiff.
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For the purpose of this case it will be conceded this is true, where
the petition states merely the citizenship of the parties, and the
amount in controversy-that is to say, simply the jurisdictional facts;
but where it goes beyond this, and states that some one not a party
to the record is the real party, and thus alleges facts that have the
effect to bar the right of the plaintiff to recover in any court, we
think a different rule must prevail. We therefore cannot say that
the record shows the plaintiff is entitled to maintain this action;
for that question is controverted, and the plaintiff is entitled to have
it tried and determined in the ordinary manner.
But conceding that the object of the assignment was to deprive
the defendant of the right to remove the action to the federal court,
yet it had the effect to vest the legal title to the claim in the plaintiff. He legally owns and controls it, and if the action is tried on
the merits, the judgment is conclusive against the world. There is
no law which prohibits the assignment. Clearly, the Act of Congress does not do so. It cannot, therefore, be a fraud on the rights
of the defendant. At most, the defendant has been deprived of a
right in a manner not prohibited by law. The assignment does not
have the effect to cut off any defence the defendant may have.
This case is clearly distinguishable from Browne v. Strode, 5 Or.
303, and . cNutt v. Bland, 2 How. 10. It has been held that when
trustees are personally qualified by citizenship to bring suit in the
federal courts, the jurisdiction is not defeated by the fact that the
parties whom they represent may be disqualified: Coal C(o. v.
Blatchford, 11 Wall. 172; .Knapp v. Railroad (., 20 Id. 123.
The converse of this proposition must be true. The results of the
litigation belong to ,the parties beneficially interested. The trustees
in one sense are mere conduits ; but as they control the litigation,
and are legally the owners of the cause of action, they are entitled
to maintain the action.
We do not understand Jones v. League, 18 How. 76, conflicts
with the foregoing views. In that case the question was whether
there had been a change of citizenship, so that the federal courts
had jurisdicti'on. The court said: "The change of citizenship,
even for the purpose of bringing suit in the federal court, must be
with the bona fide intention of beconing a citizen of the state to
which the party removes." This case recognises the right of a
party to change his residence, although it may be done for the express purpose of affecting the jurisdiction of the federal courts.
VOL. XXXII. -92
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The motive or intent, therefore, of the change is immaterial. So,
in the present case, the fact that the assignment was made to deprive
the federal court of jurisdiction is immaterial.
The assignment
was in fact made. It was authorized by law, and the assignment of
a promissory note or any other chose in action may have precisely
the same effect; that is, the legal effect of the assignment of a chose
in action may deprive or give the federal courts jurisdiction, though
not contemplated by the parties. It does not seem to us that it can
make any difference if the assignment of the chose of action was
made with the specific intent which would result from the act done
by operation of law. In the concluding paragraph of the opinion
in the case last cited it is said the conveyance or assignment in that
case must be "bona fide, so that the prosecution of the suit shall not
be" for the benefit of the assignor. No such question was before
the court in that case, and we hardly think it wasmeant that where
a party had legally divested himself of all title to the subject of the
action, that the fact he might be interested in the result of the litigation would affect the jurisdiction of the courts ; but rather that
if the assignor has retained such interest in the cause of action as
will enable him to control the litigation for his benefit, then the
jurisdiction of the courts will be affected by reason of such fact.
On the defendant's appeal the judgment of the circuit court is
affirmed, and on the plaintiff's appeal, reversed.
By the strict rules of the old common maybe transferred or assigned so as to
law choses in action could not be assigned vest the beneficial interest in the trausor granted over, " because it was thought ferree or assignee, using the latter term
to be a great encouragement to litigious- in its popular sense, yet the rule, where
ness, if a man were allowed to make unchanged by statute, is, with a few exover to a stranger his right of going to ceptions, still as above stated by Blacklaw. But this nicety is now disregarded ; stone, and the action must be brought
though, in compliance with the ancient in the assignor's name, to the use of the
principle, the form of assigning a chose assignee: Bouv. Law Dict. Assignment;
in action is in the nature of a declara- Smith on Cont. 269. There were, howtion of trust, and an agreement to per- ever, even at the common law, certain
mit the assignee to make use of the exceptions to this rule. .By the law
name of the assignor in order to recover
merchant bills of exchange were transthe possession. And therefore, when in
ferrible by indorsement, if payable to
common acceptation, a debt or bond is order, and by delivery if payable to
said to be assigned over, itmust still bearer, so as to enable the holder to sue
be sued in the original creditor's name, in his own name; and by the 3 & 4 Anne,
the person to whom it is transferred c. 9, generally re-enacted in this country,
being rather an attorney than an as- promissory notes were placed upon the
signee :" 2 B. Com. 442 ; Co. Litt. same footing. The statute of Illinois
214. Although many choses in action and a few other states upon this subject

VIMONT v. CHICAGO & N. W. RAILWAY CO.
are peculiar.

See Rev. Stat. ch. 98,
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The king, and as it seems the United
States, or a state, may receive an assignSo, though it was once doubted, an an- mcnt of a chose in action, and sue thereon
nuity which ",is a yearly payment of a in his or their own name: 2 1]I. Com.
certain sum of money granted to another 442 ; Co. Litt. 232 b, n. 1 ; UnitedStates
in fee, for life or years, charging the v. Buford, 3 Pet. 30.
person of the grantor only" (Co. Litt.
The term chose in action embraces de144 b) is assignable at common law. As mands arising out of a tort, as well as
Co. Lit. 144 b, states it, " not only the those arising out of a contract: 2 Kent.
Com. 351 ; Gillett v. Fairchild,4 Den.
grantee, but his heir and his and their
grantee also shall have a writ of annu- 80.
Causes of action ex delicto may be subity." See note (1)same page; 2 Vin.
Abr. 515 ; 3 Id.151 ; Gerrardv. Boden, divided into those affecting the person
Hetl. 80; iAfaund's Case, 7 Co. 28 b ; and those affecting property. Torts to
Baker v. Broke, Moore 5; s. c. Dy. the person are of two kinds, those resulting in the death of the person in65, pl. 1.
So, it has been held that a grant of a jured, and those not resulting in death.
At the common law no civil action
franchise to a town, as the right of a
fishery, may be the subject of a legal would lie for causing the death of a
assignment, and that the assignee may human being: Cooley on Torts 15, 262.
sue in his own name: Watertown v. This rule of the common law was in
1846 changed in England in certain
White, 13 Mass. 477.
If covenants running with the land be cases by what is known as Lord Campmade by the owner of land, who con- bell's Act, which has served as a model
veys his entire interest to the covenantee, for the numerous statutes in this country.
they are annexed to the estate, and the See, generally, Cooley on Torts 263assignee of that estate may bring his 274.
In general, it may be affirmed that
action on the covenants in his own name:
mere personal torts which [at common
I Pars. Cont. *231.
Covenants between landlord and ten- law] die with the person, and do not
ant, lessee and reversioner, run with the survive to the personal representative,
land. If one who owns in fee conveys to are not capable of passing by assignanother a less estate, as a term for ment, and conversely causes of action
years, and enters into covenants with that survive to the personal representthe-grantee, which relate to the use and atives are assignable, not indeed so as,
value of the property granted, the right independent of statute, to enable the asof action for a breach of the covenants signee to sue in his own name, but so
which the grantee has, passes to his as to entitle him to the beneficial interest
assignee, so long as this less estate con- therein : Comegys v. Vasse, I Pet. 213;
Final v. Back-us, 18 Mich. 218; Arorth
tinues: I Pars. Cont. 232.
Looking at the above so-called excep- v. Turner, 9 S. & R. 244 ; Butler v.
tions, it will be seen that in contempla- N. Y., §-c., Rd. Co., 22 Barb. 110;
tion of law some estate or interest other Purple v. Hudson Rd. Co., 4 Duer 74;
than a mere naked chose in actzon passes;
Waldron v. Willard, 17 N. Y. 468;
and doubtless an assignment of arrears 3lcKee v. Judd, 12 N. Y. 622 ; ]?ice v.
of an annuity and not the annuityitself,
Stone, 1 Allen 566: Jordan v. Gillen, 44
as well as of a cause of action for a N. H. 424 ; Grantv. Ludlow, 8 Ohio St.
breach of a covenant running with the 1 ; The Peoplev. Tioga C.P., 19 Wend.
land, &c., would not enable the assignee 73. As to what causes of action die
to sue in his own name.
with the x)erson Blackstone (3 Com.
sect. 4.
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302) says; "In actions merely personal
arising ex delicto for wrongs actually
done or committed by the defendant, as
trespass, battery and slander, the rule
is that actio personalis moritur cur persona; and it shall never be revived
either by or against the executors or
other representatives. For neither the
executors of the plaintiff have received,
nor those of the defendant have committed in their own personal capacity,
any manner of wrong or injury. But
in actions arising ex contractu, by breach"
of promise and the like, where the right
descended to the representatives of the
plaintiff, and those of the defendant have
assets to answer the demand, though the
suits shall abate by the death of the parties, yet they may be revived against or
by the executors ; being, indeed, rather
actions against the property than the person, in which the executors have now the
same interest that their testator had
before."
"In the case of injuries to the person,
whether by assault, battery, false imprisonment, slander or otherwise, if either
the party who received or committed the
injury die, no action can be supported
either by or against the executors or
other personal representatives ; for the
statute 4 Ed. 3, c. 7 (A. D. 1330) has
made no alteration in the common law
in that respect, and the statute 3 & 4
W. 4, c. 42, 2 (A. D. 1833), only gives
executors and administrators an action
for torts to personal or real estate of the
party injured, and not for mere injuries
to the person :" 1 Chit. Plead. 68.
Accordingly, it is held that a claim
for injuries to the person is not assignable b6fore final judgment: Averill v.
Longfellow, 66 Me. 237 ; McGlinchy v.
Hall, 58 Id. 152 ; Rice v. Stone, I Allen 566 ; Stone v. Boston, 4-c., Rd. Co.,
7 Gray 539 ;" Linton v. Hurley, 104
Mass. 353.
In the case of the People ex rel. Stanton v. Tioga Common Pleas, 19 Wend.
73, it was held that a chose in action for

a tort merely personal (debauching the
plaintiff's servant) is not assignable so
that a court of law will protect the assignee against the subsequent fraudulent
discharge of the damages recovered in a
suit prosecuted for such. tort, although
the tort-feasor accept the discharge with
full knowledge of the assignment. The
remedy of the assignee in such case is
by action against the assignor for breach
of his express or implied undertaking
not to do anything.in the matter to prejudice the assignee.
"At common lav, in case of injuries to
personal property, if either party died, in'
general, no action could be supported,
either by or against the personal representatives of the parties, where the action must have been in form ex delicto,
and the plea not guilty; but if any contract could be implied, as if the wrongdoer converted the property into money,
or if the goods remained in specie in
the hands of the executor or the wrongdoer, assumpsit for money had and received might be supported at common
law by or against the executors in the
former ease, and trover against the executor in the latter. By the statute 4 Ed.
3, c. 7, entitled ' executors shall have
an action of trespass, for a wrong done
to the testator,' and reciting ' that in
times past executors have not had actions for a trespass done by their testators, as of the goods and chattels of the
same testators carried away in their life,
and so such trespasses have hitherto remained unpunished,' it was enacted
'that the executors in such cases shall
have an action against the trespassers,
and recover the damages in like manner
as they, whose executors they be, should
have had if they were in life ;' and this
remedy is further extended [by the statutes 35 Ed. 3, c. 5 ; and 31 Edw. 3, c.
11] to the executors of executors, and
to administrators :" 1 Chit. Plead. 68,
69. "The statute has been construed
to extend to every description of injury
to personalproperty, by which it has been
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rendered less beneficial to the executor,
whatever the form of action may be;
so that an executor may support trespass
or trover, case for a false return to final
process, and case or debt for an escape,
&c., on final process :" 1 Chit. Plead.
69.
With respect to injuries to real property, if either party die no action in
form ex delicto could be supported either
by or against his personal representatives before the 3 & 4W. 4, c. 42, 2,"
which enacted, " that an action of trespass or trespass on the case, as the case
may be, may be maintained by the executors or administrators of any person
deceased, for an injury to the real estate
of such person, committed in his lifetime, for which an action might have been
maintained by such person," with a limitation as to tile time of the injury and of
bringing the action. This statute enacted
further Ithat an action of trespass or trespass on the case, as the case maybe, may
be maintained against tile executors or
administrators of any person deceased, for
any wrong committed by him in his lifetime to another, in respect of his property,
real or personal," with a limitation as
to time of the injury and of bringing
the action : I Chit. Plead. 69, 70.
The statute 4 Edw. 3, e. 7, has been
held to be in force in Pennsylvania and
in Massachusetts: Roberts' Die. 248 ;
Report of the Judges, 3 Binn. 610; Wilbur v. (Jilmore, 21 Pick. 252.
It is law in the state of Illinois : Rev.
Stat. Ill. c. 28, sect. I : and doubtless,
also, in many other states, if not all.
Accordingly, it is held that a cause of
action for the destruction, taking or conversion of goods and chattels which survives the party and goes to the personal
representatives, is assignable: Robinson
v. Weecs, 6 How. Pr. 161; Final v.
Backus, 18 Mich. 218 ; Grantv. Smith,
26 Id. 201 ; Brady v. Whitney, 24 Id.
154; North v. Turner, 9 S. & R. 244;
.Tordan v. Gillen, 44 N. H. 424. It is
believed that the Michigan statute al-

lowing *the assignee to sue in his own
name, does not affect this question. See
HIodyman v. Western Rd. Co., cited
infra.
But though assignable so as to vest the
beneficial interest in the assignee, even a
cause of action for injury to the property
cannot, independent of statute, be assigned, so as to vest the legal title to
the claim in the assignee: Chicago, &c.,
Rd. Co. v. Maher, 91 Ill.
312.
As to the assignment of choses in action, in some of the states statutes have
been enacted enabling the assignees of
the beneficial interest in a chose in action generally (including those arising ex
delicto) to sue thereon in their own name.
See inal v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218, 231;
Hodgman v. Western Rd. Co., 7 How.
Pr. 492. But it has been held that this
legislation creates no new right of action,
and that no authority is thereby given to
assign a right of action which was not
before assignable.
Thus, in Hodgmanv. The Western Rd.
Co., supra, it was held that under such a
statute a right of action for personal injuries received by the collision of ears
upon a railroad, was not assignable, so
as to enable the assignee to sue in his
own name, and that the action could only
be maintained by the party injured. In
delivering the opinion of the court, HAnstis, J., said : "At common law no mere
right of action was so assignable as to
pass the legal right to the assignee.
When it affected the estate of the assignor, though the legal right still remained in the assignor, so that the action
must be prosecuted in his name, the court
exercising its equity powers, would protect the rights of the assignee. The only
change made by the code in this respect,
is to transfer with the beneficial interest
the right of action also in these cases,
where before, the court would recognise
and protect the rights of the assignee.
No new right of action is created; no
authority is given to assign a right of
action which was not before assignable.
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When the right of action is of such a
nature as not to be the subject of a contract, as in the case of a violation of a
personal or-a relative right, it cannot be
assigned. The action can only be maintained by the party who has been injured, and when he dies the right af action also dies. Every right of action involving life, health or reputation, belongs
to this class.
So a right of action
founded upon a breach of promise of
marriage, being in the nature of a personal injury, cannot be transferred. On
the other band, where the injury affects
the estate rather than the person, where
the action is brought for damage to the
estate, and not for personal suffering,
the right of action may be bought and
sold. Such a right of action upon the
death, bankruptcy or insolvency of the
party injured, passes to the executor or
assignee as a part of the assets, because
it affects his estate, and not his personal
or relative rights. Of course such a
right of action is assignable, and under
the provisions of the code, the assignee
is the proper party to maintain action
upon it:" People v. Tioga Common
Pleas, 19 Wend. 73; Robinson v. Weeks,
6 How. Pr. 161 ; Chamberlain v. Williamson, 2 M. & S. 408; Flynn v. Budson River Rd. Co., 6 How. Pr. 308;

Comeg!/s v.

Vasse, I Pet. 213; and 1

Chit. P1. 68, are cited by the court to
sustain the rules above stated. See also
.Fnal v. Backus, 18 Mich. 218 ; (Grant
v. Smith, 26 Id. 201 ; Brady v. Whitney,
24 Id. 154.
Section 2525 of the Iowa Code provides that " all causes of action shall
survive and may be brought, notwithstanding the death of the person entitled or liable to the same."
See the
rule applied in Shafer v. Grimes, 23 Ia.
550 (an action for seduction) ; Carson
v. McFadden, 10 Id. 91 (an action for
libel) ; McKinlay v. McGregor, Id. Ill
(injury to the person by decedent).
From what has been alreadysaid, and
from the above cited statute it seems
clear that in Iowa, contrary to the general rule, causes of action for tort whether to the person, which at commob law
died with the person, or to property, are
assignable ; and since by the code, sect.
2543, "every action must be prosecuted
in the name of the real party in interest, except as provided in the next section," which does not affect the question,
it seems equally clear that the action was
correctly brought in the name of the
assignee.
Aico ALL

D. EWELL.

Chicago.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.
WEST PHILADELPHIA PASSENGER RAILWAY CO. v.

GALLAGHER.
It is not contributory negligence per se for a passenger to ride on the lower step
of the front platform of a crowded street-car without objection by the driver or conductor.
A boy of fourteen got upon the lower step of the front platform of a crowded
street-car, and rode for a long distance as a passenger, holding on with but one hand.
He was finally knocked off by the jolting of the car, run over and injured. In an
action against the street-car company to recover damages : Held, that the questions
of negligence and contributory negligence, taking into consideration the age and
capacity of the lad, were both for the jury.
The absence of a guard or fender on the front platform of a street-car is a fact
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which may be taken into consideration with other facts in determining the question
of the company's negligence. The court will not, howevcr, say, as matter of law,
that it is negligence on the part of the company not to furnish such a guard.

to the Common Pleas No. 4, of Philadelphia County.
Case, by James S. Gallagher, a minor, by his next friend Rudolph
Steinle, against the West Philadelphia Passenger Railway Company, to recover damages for perional injuries, caused by the alleged
negligence of the company defendant. Plea, not guilty.
On the trial, the following facts appeared:The plaintiff, a boy of thirteen years, got on a car of the defendant
company, which was very much crowded. He took a position on the
lower step of the front platform, holding on by only one hand, with
his left foot on the step, and the right one on the platform ; in this
position he rode for twenty-two squares with safety, but when near
his destination lost or let go his hold, and losing his balance, on
reaching the ground fell, so that his leg got under the wheel, was
crushed, and necessarily had to be amputated near the knee-joint.
The car was a two-horse one, and the driver collected the fares. It
had no guard or fender to the front platform, and at the time of the
accident was travelling at a rapid speed over a portion of the road
on the down grade, which made the car rock ; the testimony of plaintiff's witnesses was to the effect that the car was going no faster
than ordinarily for that part of the road in the open country,
and that while the car rocked, it was the usual rocking motion at
that rate of speed.
The court below left it to the jury to say whether the boy had
sufficient knowledge and discretion to understand the danger he assumed, and whether he assumed that danger voluntarily. The court
also charged that if the boy was pushed off by the ordinary pressure of a crowd of passengers, or the efforts of the passenger to get
off, that being the usual and ordinary pressure that might be expected in a crowded car, then the company would be liable as having
omitted the precautions that a company ought to take to protect its
passengers situated as this boy was. "The court. further charged
that while it.had not been established as matter of law that it was
the duty of a railway company to put gates on the front platforms,
the omission to do so was a fact to be taken into consideration by the
jury, and if they were of opinion that a gate or fender would have
prevented the accident, they were at liberty to say that the company
was careless in omitting to have it.
ERROR
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Verdict for plaintiff for $8000, and judgment thereon.

Where-

upon defendant took this writ, assigning for error, inter alia, that
portion of the charge above cited.
Rufus -E.Shapley, for plaintiff in error.
L.

. Cleeman and Pierce Archer, for defendant in error.

The opinion of the court was delivered by
TRUNKEY, J.-There is little conflict of testimony respecting
the number of passengers -on the car at the time the plaintiff was
hurt. The person who acted as conductor says there were between
forty-five and fifty, eight or nine of whom were on the front platform. Passengers, whether called by the plaintiff or defendant,
agree that the car was crowded, and that more might have got on ;
the conductor thinks he could have shoved on seventy, and then it
would have been pretty well packed. He also testifies that eight
or ten boys were on the car, and that he saw none of them standing
on the step of the front platform, nor on the platform itself, except
in the door. While the car ran from Forty-first street to Sixtysecond, the plaintiff stood on one of the front steps, and either the
crowd or something else kept him from the conductor's view. Had
the conductor seen him he might have considered it his duty, under
the rules of the company, to have placed him in a position of greater
safety. It appears that the rocking motion of the cars was increased
by the platforms being loaded with passengers ; also that the car at
the time of the accident was running down grade, quite as fast as
the usual rate of speed when the passengers could all be seated.
One of the witnesses, who had been a driver on that road, says the
rocking was not unusual with a loaded car, but was unusual with a
car not so heavily loaded. The front platform was without gates
or fenders. The plaintiff was nearly thirteen years and two months
old.
The fact that the front platform was not enclosed with a screen
or fender is a mattter proper to be considered, with other facts in
the case, in determining whether or not the defendant was guilty
of negligence in allowing the front door to remain open, and the
front platform to be crowded with passengers, some of whom were
children. It was the duty of the defendant to exercise reasonable
care and vigilance to carry the plaintiff safely. If on account of
the plaintiff's age and inexperience, he was incapable of taking pro-
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per care of himself, the defendant was bound to exercise the high
care and vigilance necessary and proper to secure his safety: ]ila.
City Pass. By. Co. v. Hassard, 75 Penn. St. 367. These principles apply to the duty of passenger railway companies in relation
to passengers, and are not militated by rulings in cases where children got on or attempted to get on the front platform under circumstances which, had they been of mature age, would have shown
them both trespassing and negligent, and which showed no negligence on the part of the companies.
There is no absolute rule as to what constitutes negligence.
Where a higher degree of care is demanded Under some circumstances than under others, when the standard shifts with the circumstances of the case, when both the duty and the extent of its
performance are to be ascertained as facts, a jury alone can determine what is negligence and whether it has been proven: rissey
v. Bailway Co., 75 Penn. St. 83. Where concurrent negligence
is alleged, a child will not be held to the exercise of the same degree
of care and discretion as an adult. The law does not presume that
an infant-is responsible for negligence until after he arrives at fourteen years of age: Nagle v. Railroad Co., 88 Penn. St. 35.
It has been ruled in this and other states that it is not negligence
per se for a passenger to ride on the fiont platform of a crowded
car with consent of the driver or conductor. Why should negligence be imputed to him? The railway companies invite passengers to get on, receive the fare, and thus hold out the platform as
a safe place for passengers.' That it is as safe as the inside of the
car nobody pretends. But the carrier who receives the passenger
and the compensation for carrying him, does not allege contributory negligence in the passenger for taking the place provided; he
alleges that the place is safe with dde care and vigilance. Then the
barrier is bound to higher care and vigilance when the platform is
crowded with passengers, in proportion as that place is more dangerous than a seat inside the car. And the passenger on his part
must exercise proper care under the particular circumstances. A
boy may hive much intelligence and discretion for one of his age,
and still should not be held to the measure of care that ought to be
exercised by a man of ordinary judgment.
When the evidence warrants a finding that the passenger, a boy,
rode two miles on the step of the front platform without having
been seen by the conductor, the platform full of passengers: the car
VOL. X=XMI.-93
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going at the usual speed of one not overloaded, and the rocking
motion so great as to attract the attention of numerous passengers,
the case is- one for the jury to determine whether the company exercised due care under the circumstances. And this aside from the
testimony of the boy himself respecting the pushing or jostling
against him by the crowd from the time he got on the car until his
fall. But his testimony was for the consideration of the jury.
The learned judge of the Common Pleas committed no error in
refusing to charge that "upon the whole evidence in this case the
verdict must be for the defendant."
With a single exception, we are of opinion that the defendant
(plaintiff in error) has no ground to complain of the rulings of the
court below, and that exception is the instruction set out in the
third assignment, which must be sustained. After stating that it
has been ruled that the absence of gates, or fenders, or screens is
a fact to be taken into the consideration by the jury in determining the question of negligence on the part of the defendant, the
court charged: "If, therefore, you are of opinion that a fender or
guard put upon that car, or, if upon that car on that day, would
have prevented this accident, and that there was no guard or fender
there, then you are at liberty to say that the company was careless
in omitting to have it. I refer it to the jury to say as a matter of
fact whether the absence of a guard contributed in any way to
the injury of the plaintiff. I refer that fact to you to determine."
No guard was there or claimed to have been there. Had one
been on the platform, likely it would have prevented the accident.
Its absence was a fact to be considered, with other facts in the case,
in determining what care and vigilance the defendant ought to have
exercised. Were the platform so guarded that it would be as safe
to ride there as inside, there would be no call for greater care when
occupied by passengers. The instruction to the jury was, that if
they were of opinion that a fender or guard on the platform would
have prevented the accident, they were at liberty to say the company was careless in omitting to have it. If the company was careless by reason of that omission, the omission was negligence, and it
was the duty of the company to have placed the guard on the platforn. The instruction was the equivalent of saying, as a matter
of law, that it was the duty of the company to have the platform
guarded by a fender or screen. Unless such was their duty, the
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jury were not at liberty to say the company was careless by omitting to have the platform guarded. The absence of gates or screens
is as patent to the passenger as to the carrier. Neither the street
railway companies nor the public have deemed the platforms so
unsafe that a man of ordinary prudence would not ride thereon
when the car is full inside. The court will not say, as a matter of
law, that it is in itself negligence in the carrier not to place a guard
on the platform of a horse car, or in a passenger to stand on the
open platform: Germantown Pa8s.By. v. Walling, 97 Penn. St. 55.
Judgment reversed and a venire facias de novo awarded.
The second point, of the principal case,
viz., that it is not contributory negligence
per se for a passenger to ride upon a platform of a street railway car, is in perfect
accord with the prevailing rule, yet there
is some apparent conflict in the cases,
which it is the purpose of this note to
consider.
The rule is universal, that if a plaintiff contributes to his own injury he cannot recover therefor, although the negligence of the other party is extremely
great. The law demands that every person shall provide for his own safety. The
situation in which he is placed is the criterion by which his responsibility is to
be determined. Thus the " reasonable
care," which every person is required
to exercise, is aptly termed " a varying
circumstance" : 5 Southern L. Review
(N. S.) 843; North Cent. Rd. v. Price,
29 Md. 420; UMcClup'sApp., 56 Penn.
St. 294; Lynch v. Nurdn, 1 Q. B. 36.
The degree of care to be exercised by
street-car passengers is designated as
"ordinary," and what is meant by "ordinary "is sometimes difficult of solution.
As it is "a varying circumstance," it is
not absolute, but depends upon the existence of the, accompanying facts of each
particular case: 20 Cent. L. J. 104.
It has been held that the degree of care
to be exercised in riding upon a streetcar is not so great to make it ordinary as
that required in riding upon a railway
train drawn by locomotive power: Afeeeel v. L.ynn 6 Boston Rd., 8 Allen
(Mass.) 234; Gavett v. Manchester 4

Lawrence Rd., 16 Gray (Mass.) 501.
See also Thompson on Car. of Pass. 444,
S6.
In Huelsenk-amp v. Citizens' Rd., 34
Mfo. 45, s. c. 37 Mo. 537, the car was full
on the inside, on both platforms and on
the steps. The party who received the
injury, for which the suit was brought,
was standing on the bottom, rear step,
holding on to the iron railing of the window of the car, with his body leaning
out a considerable distance from the car,
and when in such situation, in passing
another car, stationary upon a short track,
commonly called a "turn out," the cars
came so near together that his body was
crushed between them, which caused his
death almost instantly. It was after
dark when the injury happened. The
cars were not so near together but that
one could pass the other without collision.
The deceased was warned of his dangerous position by other passengers, and
that he had better get off the car or get
in further. This was held not to be such
negligence as to justify a court in taking
the case from the jury. The court, said:
"The position in which the deceased
placed himself was perhaps unsafe, but
it was not prohibited; and the evidence
further shows, that owing to the crowded
state of the cars, there was no other place
he could take. Had there been any objection to carrying him in that manner,
it would have been comprtent for the
company or its employees to have put
him off'the car; but not having done so,
they were bound to carry him with skill,
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prudence and care. There is nothing to
show that he failed to exercise ordinary
prudence and care. He might in all probability have avoided the catastrophe by
being on the alert and exercising ordinary
vigilance, but such was not required of
him. "
In Ginna v. Second Avenue Rd., 67
N. Y. 596, it is held that when a streetcar is so crowded that one taking passage
cannot enter it without unreasonable discomfort to himself and his fellow passengers, and the conductor consents to his
riding on the platform and accepts from
him the usual fare while there, and such
passenger is thrown off and injured
through the negligence of the company,
the mere fact of his being on the platform
does not per se constitute contributory
negligence, but is a question for the jury.
In Nolan v. Brooklyn 6- -NewtonRd.,
87 N. Y. 63, the plaintiff stood upon
the front platform smoking, because, as
he testified, it was the custom of the
line to permit smoking there, but not
elsewhere. There were no vacant seats
inside. While upon the platform, the
conductor took his fare, and the driver
suddenly and without warning to any one
whipped one of his horses, who plunged
under the blows, caused a jar, and threw
the plaintiff off the car. The driver attempted to stop the car, but the brakechain being out of order, he failed, and
the plaintiff was run over and injured.
The question of the plaintiff's contributory negligence was submitted to the
jury. The company had a rule posted
on its cars, forbidding passengers from
getting on and off the cars while in
motion, "or on or off the platform." It
was neld that this did not relieve the
company from responsibility. The court
said : "This rule does notforbid riding
on the front platform. It is the getting
on or getting off from that part of the
car which is forbidden ; evidently because
a misstep or an accidental fall would
there be more dangerous than at the rear
platform. But once on not a word of

warning is uttered against remaining
and riding there."
In Germantown Pass. Ry. v. Walling,
97 Penn. St. 55; s. c. 2 Am. & Eng.
Railroad Cases 20 ; the deceased hailed
a crowded passenger car, and the driver
stopped. He first went to the rear platform but could not get on by reason of
the crowd; he then went to the front
platform which was also crowded, but
succeeded in getting on the step, on
which there were already two persons.
In turning a curve, several passengers
pushed against the deceased which caused
him to break his hold from the hand
rails, and he fell under the car and was
killed. The court, in affirming the judgment of the lower court, held that the
question whether the deceased wvas guilty
of contributory negligence, was properly
submitted to the jury. In this case the
court-said : "Street-car companies have
all along considered their platforms a
place of safety, and so have the public;
shall a court say that riding on a platform is so dangerous, that one who pays
for standing there can recover nothing
for an injury arising from the company's
default ? * * * Standing on the front
platform of the horse-car when there is
room inside, is not conclusive evidence
that the person injured by the driver's
default was not exercising due care:
Maguire v. Middlesex Rd., 115 Mass.
239. A street car company has the right
to carry passengers on the platforms, and
if a passenger be injured while standing
there without objection of the company's
agent, whether the injury was with his
contributory negligence is for the jury to
decide, under all the facts and circumstances detailed in evidence."
In Hadencamp v. Second Avenue Rd.,
1 Sweeney (N. Y. Superior Ct.) 490,
the plaintiff was received as a passenge
and his fare taken, there being no room
inside, he was permitted to remain on
the front platform, and while there he
was injured. It was held that he was
not guilty of contributory negligence.
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In Meesel v. Lynn 4- Boston Rd., 8
Allen (Mass.) 234, the court said: "It
is well known that the highest speed of
a horse railroad car is very moderate,
and the driver easily controls it, stops
the car by means of his voice, his reins
and his brake. In turning round an
angle, from one street to another, passengers are not required to expect that
he will drive at a rapid rate, but on the
contrary, might reasonably expect a
careful driver to slacken his speed. The
seats on the inside are not the only places
where the managers expect passengers
to remain ; but it is notorious that they
stop habitually to receive passengers to
stand inside till the car is full, and then
to stand on the platforms till they are
full, and continue to stop and receive
them, even after there is no place to
stand, except on the steps of the platforms. Neither the officers of the corporations, nor the managers of the cars,
nor the travelling public, seem to regard
this practice as hazardous, nor does experience thus far seem to require that it
should be restrained on account of its
danger." See further Thirteenth 4- F!fteenth St. Pass.Rd. v. Boudrou, 92 Penn.
St. 475; s. c. 37 Am. Rep. 707, with
note; Sheridan v. Brooklyn 4"N. Rd.,
36 N. Y. 39 ; Clark v. Eighth Av. Rd.,
Id. 135; S. C. 32 Barb. 657; Augusta
"Sununerville Rd. v. Reng, 55 Ga. 126.
A number of cases have held that
where a passenger rides upon the platform without absolute necessity, as where
the seats are all taken, but there is standing room within the car, it is not contributory negligence perse, but is a question for the jury. Such position may be
a condition without being a cause of the
injury, as iyhere a passenger riding on
the rear platform is struck by the pole
of the following car, as in Thirteenth 4'
Fifteenth Pass. Rd. v. Boudrou, 92 Penn.
St. 475 ; s.c. 37 Am.Rep. 710.
In Burns v. Bellefontaine Rd. of St.
Louis, 50 Mo. 139, the plaintiff stood
upon the front platform when there was
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room inside. This was held not to be
negligence in itself. The court said the
company had a right to carry passengers
there, and if a passenger was injured
while standing there without objection
by the company's servants, whether it
was with his contributory negligence is
for the jury to decide. See Thompson
on Car. of Pass., p. 441, where this case
is reported in fall.
But Andrews v. Rd., 2 Mackey (S.C.
Dist. Columbia) 137 ; s. c.15 Reporter
330, seems to be in conflict with the last
case. Here the plaintiff entered the car
from the rear, to put his fare in the
box, the car being what is known as a
" bob-tail." He remained on the platform for some time; the seats were all
taken, but there was ample standing
room inside, and straps pendent from
the roof for passengers to hold by. He
had one foot on the platform and the
other in the door of the car, when, on
turning a corner, the car "produced a
jar," and be was thrown off and seriously injured. This was held per se
negligence. But this ruling cannot be
considered sound law.
A passenger may ride in such a manner upon the platform, so that he will
be chargeable with contributory negligence. Thus, in the recent case of
Downey v. Hendrie, 46 Mich. 498, the
plaintiff was sitting on the driving bar
of the front platform of the car, by the
invitation of the driver, from which posi.tion he fell and was injured. There was
ample room within the car, both standing and seating. It was contended that
as the plaintiff was invited to ride on
the front platform by the defendant's
servant, therefore the company was estopped from setting up the plaintiff's
situation as contributory negligence.
While this was acknowledged to be a
rule of law by the court, it was gaid,
"the rule is plainly not one of universal
application. Regard must be had to the
passenger's capacity to look out for himself; the opportunity there maybe to get

